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1.  Complexity in What Sort of System? 
Für the Workshop I was asked to talk about cümplexity in languagc 
from  a  typological perspectivc.  My way of approaching this  topic 
was to ask myself some questions, and then see  where the answers 
lcd.  The  first  one  was  of course,  "What  sort  of  system  are  we 
looking at complexity in - what kind of system is language?" 
There are at least three  different  kinds  of system  that we  can 
talk about, and each kind of system is  related to a  different kind of 
phenomena.  The  first  kind  are  natural  phenomena,  like  weather 
systems  and  living  organisms.  In  these  systems  you  often  find 
evolution  towards  greater  complexity - of course  you  can  havc 
simplification,  but  in  general  YOLl  luve,  at least  in  the  history  of 
evolution, likc the evolution of man, grcater and greater complexity. 
Phenomena of the second kind are the intentionally man-made 
phenolllena,  such  as  the  internal  combustion  engine,  and  here 
developmcllt  can  go  either  way  - YOli  can  have  development 
toward  more  complex  things  like  the  piston  engine  itself  (earlier 
TI", 1"1I",r  is  an  editcd  transcript  of thl'  talk  I  gavc  at  thc  Workshop. 
Wtl[dd  likc ro thank Jarnes Minen fm his l'xccllcnt transcription of my talk. 4G6  I-anguage Acquisiti()}/, Change LlIzd  EII/ergence 
Figure 1  a 
School and bus stop 
separated by a field 
RtJ~ Stup 
Sth:';:[ 
Figure 1  c 
The grass begins to wear away 
and a path emerges 
~I\ 
•  ___  • __  +_"  __  "~~_  ...  BU:-I  Stup 
StlL>C[ 
Figure 1b 
Students beg in crossing lhe field 
to gel to the bus stop 
Bw:  SlUP 
Figure 1d 
The path is recognized 
and paved 
Bus  SlUp 
types  of engines  were  somewhat  simpler)  but  then  we  also  have 
si:nplifieations, like the intentionally simplified rotary engine _  one 
ot the pluses of the rotary engine is  that it has less parts, and is  an 
overall simpler system. 
Phenomena  of the  third  kind  are  man-made,  but not ereated 
with  the intention of ereating the  thing that is  produced.  Humans 
aet according to goals but the goals in  the case of phenomena of the 
third kind are not like those in  the ca se of phenomena of the second 
kind,  that is,  to create that particular structure or that partieular 
system.  It  is  a  more  loeal  ami  personal  goal,  and  the  combined 
aetivity  of all  the  people attempting to achieve their goals creates 
that partieular phenomenon, like an  econOI1lY  01'  a  path  in  a  field. 
Phenomena  of  the  third  kind  are  often  called  'invisible  hand' 
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phcnolllena, as it is  as  if an  invisible hand creates the phenomenon. 
An  example is  thc creltion of a path through a  field  (cf. Mauthner, 
1912; Keller,  1994). Let's say  we  have two streets  separated by  a 
field;  there's a school on one street at one end of the field and a bus 
srop  on  the other street on the other side  of the field  (Figure  la). 
When  the kids come out of the school they want to go  to the bus 
stop. Their goal is  to get to the bus stop, so they try to pick an easy 
way  to get there - they cross the field  (Figure  1 b).  Maybe at first 
one or two of them cross the fiekl, and some other students see them 
doing it,  and see  that the ones who go through the field get to the 
bus stop faster and easier by going that way through the field,  and 
so  they  too start doing it;  they eopy the first  students. Then more 
alld more students cross the  field  in  the same way.  Over time,  thc 
studellts trying to get to the bus stop start tu wear away the grass, so 
a very rough path develops (Figure 1e). It's not that somebody said 
"Let's form  a  path." It's  just that a  lot of people tried  to find  the 
most effieient way to get to the bus stop from the sehool, and they 
ended  up  walking  the  same  way  through  the  field,  trampled  the 
same grass,  killed the grass,  and ereated a  path.  Eventually people 
start using the path just beeause it is  there, without thinking about 
whether it  is  the best way tu go through the fiekt  At some point, 
either out of simple eonventionalization or beeause of some soeial 
faetor (e.g. attitudes tuwards preserving the grass that is  left), it may 
beeome reeognized as  the "ul1marked" way to go through the field 
and erossing any other way would be  eonsidered "marked". What 
happens  in  soeiety  often  is  that  a  development  like  this  ean  be 
recognized  and  then  made  official  - you  pave  the  path  (Figure 
td) - ami then it beeomes prescriptive. 
The  path  thus  created  is  a  phenomenon  of  the  third  kind. 
Language is  also a phenomenon of the third kind. It is  not a natural 
pheno!l1enon,  it does not follow the same kind of natural bws; it is 
hased  on  hUlllans  trying to da something, but not trying to ereate 
bnguagc.  Its  dcvc!opment  is  a  type  of  evolution,  but  it  can  go 
toward grcatcr or lesser complexity. Just as with the path, there ean 
;llso IX'  intTntional manipulation of language, such as when we write 
prl'scriptive  grammars,  01'  standardize  languages.  There  ean  be 468  Language ACQllisitioll, Change and Emergence 
planned ec~nomies and planned languages, like when Malay pidgin 
was made 111tO  Bahasa Indonesia, the national language of Indonesia. 
In this case, they chose Malay Pidgin rather than Javanese to be the 
n~tional language  because Javanese  is  more complex than Malay 
Pldgm.  Javanese  has  multiple  levels  of politeness  registers  - five 
levels of politeness - and this makes it difficult to leam and use, so 
they chose Malay Pidgin, as they wanted a  language that would be 
easier for everybody to learn and use. 
2.  Complexity in  Different Subsets 
of Human Conventions 
One of the  things  I  want to  talk  about  is  complexity in  different 
subsets of human conventions. Language is  just one of many types 
of convention; it's a tool that has developed, one of many tools that 
we have developed. Humans do things and, in the process of trying 
to do something, create systems and tools. One of the many types of 
tools that we have developed is  the type of tools we use for eating. 
We  can have  a  system  of great cOlllplexity  or a  simple  system in 
terms of the way we eat. Take for eX<lmple  the Western formal place 
setting presented in Figure 2a, which is  from a  web page2 that was 
set up to tell  people how to set a  formal  picKe  setting at home. In a 
formal  banquet in  a  restaurant there might be even more forks, or 
more knives and spoons. Here we've got a salad fork, a dinner fork, 
a  soup spoon, a  tea  spoon, different glasses  for  different  kinds  of 
wine, one glass for water, a serving plate, a bread plate, a soup bowl, 
a  bread knife, another knife, and if steak was being served, a  steak 
knife would also  be  added. This  is  a  relatively complex system for 
eating.  However, you  can also  have  a  relatively simple system for 
eating, as in  Figure 2b, which is only a bowl and a pair of chopsticks. 
In  fact  in many of the  places  where I go to do  fieldwork  in  rural 
2  http://www.visatahlclinen.colll!formaLhtml,  Millikcn  Table  Line,  &  Table 
Cloths:Table Sctting:Formal Dinner Place Settings. 
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China you don't even get the bowl, all you get is  the chopsticks. In 
many  places  in  the  Philippines  and  Burma  you  just  use  your 
h~lnds - that's even simpler, but, of course, that's not a developed 
wo!. Thc minimal tool is the chopsticks. 
Figure 2a. Western formal dinner pi ace setting 
I  '  ;  I  I  . 
~  I) 
A.  Napkln  H. Salad Fork 
B.  Service plate  I.  Dinner Fork 
C  Soup bowl on  a liner plate  J.  Dessert Fork 
D.  Bread and Butter Plate with butter knife.  K.  Knife 
E.  Water glass  L.  Teaspoon 
F. Wine glass  M. Soup Spoon 
G. Wine glass 
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So you can have complexity or the lack of it in different systems 
within your overall set of conventions. What happens in one system 
may influence what happens in  other systems. For example, cutting 
up the food  hefore  it's served,  as  the  Chinese do,  means  it is  not 
necessary to have a  knife at the table. In a Western setting we have 
to have a steak knife when eating steak because the cook has not cut 
the  steak  up  into  bite-size  pieces  before  serving  it.  In  a  Chinese 
setting, the cook has already cut the food up. So  the conventions of 
cooking influence the conventions of eating. There are a lot of other 
types  of conventions  that  influence  each  other.  For example,  the 
Jingpo  people  of Yunnan  don't  fertilize  their  crops,  and  so  they 
don't save human manure like a  lot of other peoples do to use  as 
fertilizer  for their crops. And since they don't save  human manure 
they don't even build bathrooms, they just go to the woods. Because 
of  this,  they  don't  have  a  native  word  for  'bathroom'.  Their 
conventions  of  agriculture  influence  their  conventions  of 
architecture, which in turn influence their conventions of language. 
There  is  influence  in  terms  of complexity,  as  complexity  in  one 
system can mean simplification in another, for example complexity 
in the conventions of food  preparation may result in  simplicity in 
the tools that you need to eat with. 
Now  let's  look  at  a  linguistic  example.  The  speakers  of the 
Qiang  language  (Tibeto-Burman;  northern  5ichuan)  conventional-
ized the set of orientation marking prefixes on the verb given in (1). 
(1 )  Qiang directional prefixes (ifue 'throw') 
t;;JifU  'throw up  Z;;JifU  'throw towards the 
(the mountain)'  speaker' 
Ilc7iflJ  'throw down (the  daifU  'throw away from the 
mountain)'  speaker' 
S;;Jifli  'throw down-river'  ;;Jf{1I  'throw inside' 
n.7lfl/  'throw up-river'  haifll  'throwoutside' 
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These prefixes (the first syllable of the forms given) are a system 
for  marking  the  direction  or  orientation  of  the  action,  such  as 
'throw up the mountain', 'throw down the mountain', 'throw down 
river',  'throw  up  river'.  This  system  has  also  been  extended  to 
l1larking perfectives, as in (2) and (3), and imperatives, as in (4). 
(2)  the  S;;J-t~'-I)Jke,  ifWlt~';;J  XU;;Jla-k 
3sg  DIR-eat-following  bowl  wash-go 
'5/he finished eating and went to wash the bowI.' 
(3)  I7JS  qa  ;;J-qa  lai  the:  stuaha  t~h;;J 
yesterday  Lsg  DIR-go:lsg  time  3sg  food/rice  eat 
'Yesterday when I entered the room, s/he was eating.' 
(4)  ;;J-z-na! 
DIR-eat-IMP 
'Eat!' 
In (2) and (3), the verb in the first clause has the direction prefix 
because  the  action  was  completed,  while  the  verb  in  the  second 
clause of each example does not have aprefix, as the action is  not 
completed (and the direction of action is  not important here). In  (4) 
the directional prefix appears on the verb because it is  an imperative 
clause (see LaPoIla, 2003, for details). The point I'm making he  re is 
that even within language, once you have conventionalized a system, 
you can extend its use to marking some other functional domain. In 
Qiang a kind of marking which originally developed as a system of 
orientation or direction marking is  now used for marking perfectives 
and  imperatives.  The  complexity  in  this  system  now  allows  for 
simplicity in  other types of marking - you don't have to develop a 
separate set  of perfective  or imperative  markers,  you  just use  the 
same  forms  that  already  exist  in  the  language  for  some  other 
purpose. It  can  be  said that having something in the language that 
could easily  be  metaphorically extended to another use  encourages 
the dcve!opl11ent of the nlarking also, so it might not just be that it 
allows  for  the  simplicity  of the  other system  but  that it  actually 
cncourages the development of that particular use, because you have 
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3.  Complex for Whom? 
An important question that came up when I was thinking about this 
topic was, "Complex for whom?" In China, cutting up the food into 
small pieces makes the job of the cook more complex; the cook has 
to worry about how he  or she is  going to cut the food.  In fact,  in 
Chinese  cooking,  one  test  of  a  cook  is  how  he  or  she  cuts;  in 
Western cooking, I don't think they worry so much about cutting, 
but  in  Chinese  cooking  it  is  very  important  how  you  cut  things 
because  you have  to cut  up  aH  the food  before you serve  it.  This 
makes  the  job  of the  cook  in  China  much  more  complex  but  it 
makes the  job of the  diner  much simpler - aga  in,  you  luve the 
complexity of the cooking job making the eating much easier. It is 
the same with language;  a  simple system of writing or language is 
less  complicated for  the writer or the speaker. For example, if you 
have  a  writing system  that doesn't have  strang conventions about 
punctuation or a  particular set word order, and has a  set of other 
features  that are  relatively  open  to  speaker  or writer choice,  this 
simplicity makes it easier for the writer, who doesn't need to worry 
about having to follow so me  set of prescriptive forms, but it allows 
ambiguity,  which  makes  it  more  complicated  for  the  reader. 
Consider the following attested examples of Chinese writing. 
In Chinese, an author can chose various orders in which to write. 
In  (5a) the writer wrote from left to right; in (5b) the author wrote 
from right to left. When you see these restaurant signs, as  both are 
three  characters  long,  and  there  is  nothing  in  the writing  system 
which teHs  you which way to read them, you have to use  inference 
to figure out yourself which order is correct. So the job of the reader 
is  more  complicated  because  there  is  no  standard  direction  of 
reading.  It  can  be  even  more  complicated,  as  in  the  case  of (5c), 
which is  a sign in Taipei, where you have to read from left and right 
at the same time,  a  short version of two two-character names (the 
three characters are, from left to right, "lao bao gong", representing 
"lao  bao"  and  "gong  bao",  two  typcs  of  Il1cdical  plans  in 
Taiwan) - to save space on thc sign  they just lISC  thrcc characters; 
instead  of writing  "lao  bao"  ami  "gung  bau",  sillCl'  olle  of  the 
"""?'::f  ...  ~' , 
'j 
(5) 
a.  Left to right: 
b.  Right to left: 
c.  Right to left and 
Lcft to right: 
d. Top to bottom / 
Right to leh: 
e.  Top to bottom / 
Left to right 
f.  Top to bottom / 
??  Does it matter? 
-+ 
J)] f!!t** 
~ 
31G: 1UJ iff: 
-+  ~ 
~1*0 
J:: /f~:* 
J'flil)t' IJ\ 
A tIG fPJ 
wH'i1~ 
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(restaurant sign in HK) 
(restaurant sign in HK) 
(clinic sign in Taipei) 
(book cover) 
(Guangming Daily 
2002/4/21) 
(sign in Hong Kong 
minibus) 
CkH<1cters  is  thc same in both, they just have you read it from both 
sieles  in  at the same time. In Chinese it is  also possible to write. from 
.  11  .  (5d  )  When you write vertlCally  top  tu  bottol11  vertlca  y,  as  111  ,  e .  ' 
.  .  f  .  h  1 f  .  (5d)  the tide of a book, 
YOll GIn  wntl' elther  rom ng  t to  e t, as m,  . 
.  .  .  )  h  dl·  f om  a  mainland  Ch111ese  or  klt  to  fight,  as  111  (5e ,a  ea  me  r 
.  h·  .  h  Tipt  and  no  hard  and  fast  lll'\vspapl'r.  There  lS  not  111g  111  t  e  sc 474  Lallgllage Acquisitioll, Change dlld bncrgence 
conventions,  except  for  the  convention  that  when  it  is  written 
vertically it should be  top to bottom,3 that tell you wh  ich way you 
are going to have  to read it;  you  have to figure  that out by  trying 
different possibilitics  and  then  deciding  wh  ich  makes  more  sense. 
Thc simplicity  of the  conventions  related  to word  order makes  it 
easier for thc writer, because the writer doesn't have to follow many 
strict conventions, as  in  English.  However, it  makes the job of the 
reader more complex because  the  reader  has  to  usc  a  much  more 
complicated inferential process to figure out which way makes sense. 
The  process  is  not  simplified  for  the  reader.  And  sometimes,  of 
course,  you  get  to  a  situation like  in  (Sf),  which  is  a  sign  in  the 
mini-buses in Hong Kong, where one may not be sure which way to 
read it.  For the first six years that I have lived in Hong Kong I have 
always  read  this  top to  bottom and  right  to  left,  but when I  was 
preparing  the  talk  for  the  workshop  1  began  to  think  maybe  it 
should  be  read top to  bottom and left  to  right,  because  it  makes 
sense either way. But it's just a matter of which one you think makes 
more sense, because the three lines are three independent sentences. 
Y  ou notice  of course  that there  is  no  real  separation of anything 
within  the  clauses  as  weil,  so  there  is  a  lot of inference  going on 
when  you  are  reading  this.  On  the  other  hand,  if  you  have  a 
standardized word order and punctuation, the  job of the writer is 
more complex, because the writer has to worry about using the right 
word order and punctuation, but it sirl1plifies thc task for the reader 
because it's constraining the reader's inferential process. 
Now, there can bc  differences  in  terms of complexity between 
any two systems, and within a single system there are also different 
possibilities  for  complexity,  so  we  might  have  a  difference  in 
complexity  of  the  overall  system,  such  as  the  difference  in  the 
3  These patterns of writing go all  the  way hack  to rhc  oldest fonn of Chinese 
writing,  oracle  bone  inscriptions,  texts  written  on  ox  scapubs  and  turtle 
plastrons that had been  burned and cracked in divination rituals, where thc 
writing  rehning  to  a  particular  divination  had  to  bc  ncar  thc  relevant 
divination crack, and thc dircction of thc cracks influenced thc direetiol1  of 
the inscription (sec Kcighrley,  1975, §2.  ').4 for details). 
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systems  of cating  Chinese  and  Western  food,  but  even  within  a 
single  system,  Iike  the system of English language  use,  the speaker 
ha~  choices  in  terms  of  how  complex  to  make  an  utterance. 
COllsider thc following example: 
(6)  Q: 
Al: 
Al: 
A3: 
A4: 
A5: 
A6: 
Do you want something to drink? 
(points to soup bowl) 
I have soup. 
No. I haue soup. 
No  because I have soup. 
No: since I have soup, I don't need anything to drink. 
No,  I  don't want anything to  drink.  Since  I  have soup, 
I don't need anything else to drink right now. 
This was a conversation I had with my wife while eating dinner. 
I asked her Do you want something to drink? - her  answ~r was to 
.  h  b  I· that was her answer and I had to fIgure out  pomt to  er soup  ow,  . 
what that meant. Simply  pointing like  that me ans I  have to  ftgur.e 
out what she  is  pointing at, and if I  guess it is  the bowl that she  IS 
pointing at, then I  have to notice that the bowl is  fu11,  and then I 
have  to notice  wh  at  kind of thing is  in  the  bowl,  t~en I  have  to 
somehow think that's relevant,  and then guess  how It  IS  relevant, 
d then I have to figure out that if it's a full bowl of soup (broth), 
an  h'  d  .  1 
then think back that l'm asking her if she wants somet  mg to  nn  <, 
and since  soup is  a liquid, maybe what she's thinking is  that smce 
she has a bowl full of liquid she docsn't need anythmg else to. dnnk. 
So  with  pointing  as  her  answer  1  have  to  do  a11  of  thls  v~ry 
complicated inference. But if  she says  ~ have soup, at least the  f1r~; 
part of my  inferential process IS  constramed - flg.unng outwhat s 
is  poil1ting at and what's in  the bowl, that part IS  ma.de  slmpl,e~. If 
shc says  No,  I "eWC soup, then my  inferenual process IS  constram~d 
evcn  more;  it  is  made  even  more simple  by  the  f~ct  th~t she  has 
addcd the word r!O, but I still have to infer the relatIOnship between 
"1  h  oup"  She  could  also  thc  wort!  1/0  and  the  concept  ave  s  . 
.  .  I  >  d  because  She  could say  C()1lstrain  that part by  puttmg 1\1  t le  wor  .  I'  h' 
No  !!('C,lttSC  I have soup, and thcn my  inference of the re atlOns  Ip 
,  11  1  b  .  nstrained  The answers  betwccn NO and I have soup wou u a so  e co  . 476  Langllage AcqllisitiOlI, Challge and r~lI1('rgellce 
in  (6A5)  and  (6A6)  would  also  bc  possible,  and  again,  thc  more 
eomplex the uttcranee that she uscs, thc more simple mv infercnec . 
I  "  I  J  In 
(etermll1ll1g  ler eommunieative intcntioll.  It is  likc  thc  exalllpie of 
wntll1g systems givcn  above: the morc eomplex it is  for  onc oE  the 
two eommullleators,  thc  more  simple  it  is  for  thc  otllel"  d  .  .  <ln  VlSe  versa. 
4.  Background: Ostension and Inference 
Now  I  have  to  back  up  a  little  bit  alld  talk  about what  human 
eommunieation  is  all  abc)Llt.  Human  eommunication  isn't  about 
language,  and  language  is  not what  is  most important to  human 
eommunieation;  as  I  mentioned,  langllage  is  just  a  too1.  What 
happens in  communieation is  somebody does something,  wbat we 
eall  an  ostensive act, that gets the other person's attention and the 
other person then, having seen  the purposeflllly done aet,  assumes 
that tbe  other person  did  that aet for  a  reason, and  then  tries  to 
figure  o~t what that reason was; that's eommunication. Language is 
not cruelal to commllnieation. We communicate all the time without 
language,  just  like  my  wife  pointing  to  her  soup  bow1.  Another 
example  is  from  one  morning  shortly  before  the  Workshop.  I 
want~d  t~ eommunicate something to my wife, but there was a guest 
sle~pl!lg  I!l  tbe  room,  so  I couldn't say  anything.  Therefore  I  just 
pOll1ted  upward  with  my  index  finger.  What  I  was  trying  to 
commllnieate was that I was going to go  up to the roof to do my 
exerCises,  and  she  understo()(i  that.  So  Ianguage  is  not absoilltdy 
neeessary for communication, eommunieation ean happen  whether 
YOLl  lIse  langllage  or  not.  The  thing  that  languagc  docs  in 
communication is  constrain thc addressee's inferential proeess. The 
ostensivc  aet,  which  1l1ay  be  linguistie  or  not,  draws  the  other 
person's  attention  and  makes  them  think  that  the  aet  is  done 
purposefully and that they should apply some infcrcntial proecss to 
figure out what the eommunieator's intention was in  doing this. As 
we assume that people are rational (that's the basis of Crice's (1975) 
Co-operative Prineiple),  when  they do an  ostensivc aet we  assUlllc 
they  must be  doing it for  a  reason and we should  figurc  out  what 
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that rcason  iso  The way we  figure  it out is  we ereate a  eontext in 
whieh  that  ostcnsivc  aet  makes  scnse.  Just  like  tbe  example  of 
poillting at thc soup bowl, we have to figure out how pointing at the 
soup bowl eould make sense in  the eontext of expeeting an answer 
to IllY  qucstion. I luve to work through all the possible assumptions 
that  I  ean  put  togethcr  and  ereate  a  eontext  of  interpretation  in 
whieh that partieular ostensive aet makes sense as an answer to my 
qucstion. The thing that Ianguage ean do is c<mstrain the ereation oE 
this eontext of interpretation. In  diseussing the examplc of the soup 
bowl,  I  gave  alternative  responses  with  more complex forms,  anti 
showed  how  the  more  eomplex  the  linguistic  form,  the  more 
eonstrained I would be in ereating the context of interpretation and 
in  figuring  out what my  wife's communieative intention was,  her 
intention to tell me that she didn't want anything to drink. 
I want to point out something in  my view of Ianguage that is 
different from a lot of other people's view of language. In most work 
on language and eommunieation, cven  in  pragmaties, the form  of 
the utteranee is  taken as given and it is  assumed that the eontext is 
variable, and that we use the context to disambiguate the form. I see 
it  the  other  way  around.  Thc  way  I  see  it,  when  we  are  in  a 
communicative situation, we don't have  a  lot of choiee  ahout the 
eontext,  we  are  in  that  eontext.  What  we  can  choose  is  what 
partieular ostensive aet, what particular utterance, we are going to 
use in  that context, so that's the thing that is  variable and that is the 
thing that's constraining the ereation of the eontext of interpretation. 
Language and the rules for its  use in  a partieular soeiety are a set of 
soeial  eonventions  that  have  evolved  in  a  partieular  way  in  that 
socicty in  a  response to the need to C()f1strain  the inferential proeess 
involved  in  communieation  in  partieuLu  ways  thought  to  be 
iIl1portant in  that soeiety. Let me eomc back to this. 
5.  Is Complexity Necessary? 
Let  Ille  first ask, "Is complexity nceessary?" In  so  me ca ses, like what 
wc  S;lW  in  thc  SOLlp  bowl  examplc,  in  talking  with  me,  my  wiEe 
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I could figure the rest out. Jf she was in  a  restaurant and the waiter 
asked her,  "Do you want somcthing to drink?"  1 don't think she 
could get away with just pointing at her soup bowl. So whether or 
not you need a certaill level of complcxity will dcpend on where you 
are, and on the complexlty of other systems. We use forms to fit the 
context,  and  if  we  are  in  a  particular  context  often,  and  use 
partlcular  forms  in  particular  ways  to  fit  that  conte'xt  th,  ,  ey  can 
become  conventionalized.  Like  the  Qiang  directionals  mcntioned 
earlier. I don  't think it  is  a coincidence that the Qiangs live on th 
sides  of steep mountains overlooking river  valleys, s; they alway: 
h.ave  to be gOlIlg  up and down, towards the river and away from the 
flver.  Those  are  important aspects  of their  environment,  and  this 
fact has led to forms for constraining the hearer's interpretation in 
ways  relevant  to  these  aspects  becoming conventionalized in  their 
language. The nature of a society, such as the size and complexity of 
the speech community.'  can influence  the  patterns of the language 
spoken, and thls  Will  III turn influence the form  that the language 
takes. There has  been a  lot of work on this.  In particular, Trudgill 
(1996,  1997) pointed out that in a  small community you are more 
likely  to  have  more  complex  phonological  systems,  whereas  in  a 
widespread homogeneous community you are going to have simpler 
phonological  systems.  So  there  are  all  kinds  of factors  that  can 
influence the level of complexity of a system. 
Now another thing about complexity, as we saw with the soup 
bowl example, is  that more complex generally means more specific 
or more exacting. So if 1 want to have two pieces of bread instead of 
one, I can rip it into two with my  hands - that's the simplest way 
to deal with the problem - or I can use a tool. It's more complex to 
use a tool, but if r use a tool I get a more exact cut. This is  the same 
with  language;  the  use  of  more  explicit  language  constrains  the 
hearer's  interpretive  process  much  more,  and  so  the  hearer's 
interpretation is  more Iikely  to  be  exactly the one intended  by  the 
speaker. For example, consider the two sentences in (6): 
(6)  (a)  Peter's not stupid.  (b)  He can find his own way horne 
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(7)  a.  Pctcr's not stupid; so hc can find his OWH way home. 
b.  Pctcr's not stupid; after all, he can find his own way hüme. 
(from Wilson and Sperber, 1993:11) 
If one wcrc  to say  "Peter's not stupid.  He can find  his  own way 
home,"  without anything marking the logical relations  hip between 
the two sentences, it would be  up to the hearer to figure  out what 
the relationship iso  There are two logical possibilities at least. It isn't 
obligatory to make explicit what the relationship iso  But you could 
make it explicit; you could say Peter's not stupid so he can find his 
OWll  way horne,  as  in  (7a),  or Peter's  not stupid; after alt,  he  can 
find  his  own way home,  as  in  (7b).  The  relationship  between the 
two c1auses can be made explicit by the use of so or after alt,  and 
this is  parallel to using a knife to cut bread; it makes the action more 
exacting, more  fine  in the ca  se  of cutting, and more explicit in the 
case of linguistic actions, and in doing that, by constraining, in the 
linguistic  example, the  inferential  process,  the speaker reduces  the 
chances that the hearer will not be  able  to construct a  context of 
interpretation  in  which  the  utterance  makes  sense.  That  is,  it 
increases  the  likelihood  that  the  hearer  will  correctly  deduce  the 
communicative intention of the speaker, just as you are more likely 
to get a  nice  neat cut of two even  pieces of bread if you separate 
them with a knife rather than by hand. 
Now,  why  might  a  languagc  develop  an  obligatorily  explicit 
form?  For  a  pattern  of  explicitness  to  be  used  often  enough  by 
enough  people  for  it  to  become  conventionalized,  it  must  be 
constraining the interpretation of some salient category. That is,  it 
has  a  cultural  motivation.  In  some  cases  it  isn't easy  to  find  the 
cultural  assumptions  that  lead  to  the  conventionalization  of  a 
certain form of explicitness, but sometimes it iso  For example, when 
a  speaker  of  Kalam  (Pawley,  1993;  Pawley  and  Lane,  1998),  a 
language of Papua New Guinea, is  reporting an event, he  or she  is 
expected to make reference to the whole sequence of situations and 
actions associated with the overall event, such as whether the actor 
was at the scene of the event or moved to the scene; what the actor 4HO  Li/llgll,l!:!Jl Acquisiti()/l, ChilI/ge ,1I1d  Ll11ergel/d' 
did; whether the actor then Idt the scene, and if so whether the actnr 
took the affected object along or not; 3nd what the final outcome of 
the event was - all  of these are clliturally  required when  YOll  are 
describing  some  event.  In  English,  you  cOLlld  jllst  say  The  man 
fetched firew()od,  but in Kalam, you c3n't just say 'fetched firewood', 
Y°tl  have  to  say  the  wbole  se ries  of events  that  happened  in  his' 
going,  his  comillg  back,  what  happened  in  betwl'en,  anel  so  the 
narrative will  be  very  complex, allel  this complexity is  reqllired  by 
tbe clliture. The interpretation of these aspects of the event are then 
generally more constrained in  Kalam than in  English. The narrcltion 
of tbese sub-actions can take tbe form of many complex clauses  or 
in  the case of relatively commonly recurring multi-action events,'  ca~ 
take the form of a conventionalized serial verb construction, as in (8) 
(from Pawley,  1993:95). In (9)  is  a  conventional expression fm 'to 
massage' in Kalam (Pawley, 1993:88). 
(8)  b  ak  Cl11I  mOll  p-wk  d  ay-a-h 
(9) 
man  that  go  wood  hit-bread  get  come  put-3sg-PAST 
'The man fetched some firewood.' 
l)k  wyk  d  ap  tem  d  ap  ya!,  g-
strike  ruh  hold  come  ascend  hold  come  descend  d<> 
'to massage' 
It is  becallse of the requirement on the explicitness of narration 
that the Ianguage has developed tbe sets of serial verb constructions 
that  code  frequently  occurring  sets  of  action  sequences.  That  is, 
because certain  actions  often were  narrated  in  the  same  way, ami 
repeated  over  and  over  again,  what  formerly  took  the  form  of 
several clallses became simplified to aserial verb constrllction. 
Now, whether or not we can find a smoking gun - in this case 
there's  a  very  elear smoking gun, they  bave a  societal  expectation 
that a  speaker should narrate all these sub-actions of an  event, and 
we  can  use  that  to  explain  the  devclopment  of  the  serial  verb 
constructions - the fact that the pattern of explicitness  is  rcpcated 
often  enough  to  becol1lc  conventionalized  melOS  that it  has  to  be 
., 
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Cliltur~llly  important. Some  people cll-gue  that if you can't find  the 
motivation  for  sOl11e  particular form,  you can't say  it's  motivated. 
My  point  of  view  is  that  grammar,  or  any  linguistic  structure, 
devclops out of patterns that  have  been  repeatedly  llsed  over and 
over again so often that they becallle conventionalized, and the fact 
that they becallle conventionalized llleans that they had to have bcen 
repeatcd a  lot, and the fact that they were repeated a  lot l11eans  that 
they  had  to  have  been  constraining some  important aspect of the 
interpretation; a  speaker is  not going to repeat something often if it 
is  not  important to  hilll  or  her  to constrain tbe  inference  in  that 
particuLu way_ 
6.  We Seem to be Able to Do Weil Without Some 
Forms of Complexity 
Getting back  to  this  question  of wbether complexity  is  necessary, 
sOl1letimes  it  seems  we  can  do  withoLlt  it.  For  eX<1111ple,  in  Old 
English there was a very cOlT1plcx  system of declension of nouns and 
adjectives,  but  we  do  quite  weil  without  it  now.  Old  English 
inflected nOUI1S  and adjectives for four different cases in singular and 
plural,  and  an  adjective  had  three  different  forl1ls  for  the  three 
different  genders  (actually  si x,  as  there  werc  different  fonns 
dcpending on whether the noun took a demonstrative or not). In (10) 
are examplcs of tbe !1ouns stün 'stone' (m<1sculine  a-slem), gicfit 'gift' 
(feminine (>-slcm), and hUllter 'hunter' (masculine consonant stem): 
(10)  Singular  Nominative  st/in  <Ticf~lI  c  hUllt-a 
Genitive  st/in-es  gief~c  hunt-an 
Dative  st:Tn-c  (Tic'f~c  c  hunt-an 
Accusative  stiIn  gid~e  hunt-an 
Plural  Nominative  st,Tn-:Js  gie/~<z  hunt-iln 
Genitive  stün-i!  gid~a  hunt-cnd 
Dative  st<ln-Ulll  gieFlIlll  hunt-um 
Accusative  slün-ilS  lTicf~a 
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In ,(11).  is  the  declension  of göd 'good'  when  preceded  b  a 
demonstrative (gender IS  neutralized in  thc plural when the  fon~ 
preeeded  b.y  a  demonstrative,  but  not  when  not  preeeded  b  IS 
demonstratIve):  y  a 
(11) 
Singular  Nominative 
Genitive 
Dative 
Aeeusative 
Plural  Nominative 
Genitive 
Dative 
Aecusative 
Modern farms: 
Singular (for a11  eases) 
Plural (for a11  cases) 
Masculine  Feminine  Neuter 
göd-a  göd-e  gäd-e 
god-ill7  gäd-on  göd-an 
göd-a/7  göd-al]  gäd-an 
göd-[lll  göd-an  gäd-e 
göd-an 
göd-enez or "göd-ra 
göd-um 
gäd-an 
stone  gift  hunter  goud 
stones  gifts  hunters  goud 
Speakers  of the system  of Old English  had  to  ehoose  one of the 
forms  fron~ these paradigms every time they wanted to mention a 
stone,  a  gIft,  a  hunter,  or  say  something  was  good  a  d  h'  d'  ,  n  t  ese 
para  Igms are quitl' eomplieated, whereas in the modern system the 
paradJgm  I'  I 
.  L  IS  mue 1  slmp er,  just  stone/stones,  gift/gifts, 
hunter/hunters,  and only one form  for  the  adjeetive.  We  do okay 
wlth thls SImple system; we don't need a great deal of eomplexity. A 
language doesn't have to develop towards more eompll'xiry.  In the 
ease  of English,  it  developed  away  from  that  partieular  type  oE 
eomplexlty. 
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7.  Complexity as a Feature 01 Categories, 
Not Language 
One  of  the  things  that  I  want  to  mention,  when  talking  about 
lingllistic complexity, is  that it is  not that we want to talk abollt a 
language as a  whole as  being complex or not complex; we need to 
think  in  terms  of sub-systems  or  eategories  of the  Ianguage.  For 
example,  Chinese  has  a  simpler  system  in  terms  of  not  having 
conventionalized tense marking, so a  speaker doesn't have to worry 
about tense  when speaking, one can  just say,  for example,  Wö'  qu 
xl/t.ixü)u 'I go sehool' and not say whether it was in the past, in  the 
future or whatever, so in terms at least of the speaker it's an easier 
job.  But  Chinese  has  developed  a  complex  system  of  lexieal 
categories coded in taxonomic compounds such as long-xiä 'lobster' 
(dragon-shrimp),  fing-ytt  'whale'  (whale-fish),  and  sl5ng-shil  'pine' 
(pine-tree), where the seeond syllable identifies the taxonomie dass 
that  the  referent  belongs  to.  It  also  has  a  complex  system  of 
c1assifieation of nouns using what we eall noun dassifiers, so  YOLl 
don't just say 'one book', like in English, where you don't have to 
worry  about what class  of object  YOll're  talking about when  you 
want to  quantify an  objeet.  In  Chinese you  have  to worry about 
what eategary you are talking aboLlt, and add the classifier for that 
eategory  when  you  quantify  that  objcct.  Compare,  for  example, 
English  one  baok  vs.  Chinese  yf  !Jen  smi  (one 
classifier.for.book-like.objects book),  English  one table vs.  Chinese 
yi' Zhll!1g zhuözi (une  classifier.for.flat.rectangular.objects table).  !t's 
more complex when you have to know what eategory eaeh word is 
in in order to quantify it.  The point is  that Chinese has developed 
eomplcx  systems  for  constraining  the  interpretation  of  some 
functional domains,  but not others, and so we ean't make blanket 
statements  about  Ianguages,  we  need  to  look  at  each  funetional 
dOl11ain  to see how the language deals with it. 
Different sub-systems of a  language ean also  interaet. Ta give 
une exalllple,  Proto-Arawak, an  Amazonian  langllage, had several 
!ocativc  eases  but  no  n1arking  of  grammatieal  relations.  Later, 484  Language Acqltisition, Change and Emergence 
mainly through contact with other, unre1ated, languages in the same 
area, Tariana, an Arawak language, developed a complex system for 
marking  grammatical  relations  by  restructuring  the  locative  cases 
(Aikhenvald,  2003).  Tariana  originally  had  a  complex  locative 
system  and a  simple,  or no,  system  of grammatical relations,  but 
then  It  restructured  the  locative  cases  into  a  complex  system  for 
marking grammatical relations and certain other features, and at the 
same time simplified the locative  markings so  that it now has only 
one very general locatlve ca se  marker as  opposed to having several 
before. Sometimes this can go back and forth - this is why we need 
~o think about complexity in  terms of the partiCLilar categories, not 
111  terms of whole languages. 
8.  Complexity of Language as aRefleetion of 
Complexity of Cognitive Categories 
The  complexity  of  language  is  a  reflection  of  the  complexity  of 
cognitive  categories.  The clearest example  of course  is  phonemes; 
phonemes are categories. When we are hahies, we can distinguish all 
kinds of sounds, but then !ater on we get into the habit of thinking 
that certain sounds go together in one category and other sounds get 
divided  between  two  categories.  ror  example,  English  speakers 
perceptually  group  together  the  voiced  stop  initials  and  voiceless 
unaspirated initials as one category, so they don't hear the difference 
between [bai and [pal. BeCluse of this, when a Chinese speaker says 
[peit<;il) I 'Beijing',  with  a  voiccless  unaspirated  initial,  an  English 
speaker will hear it as if it is the same sound as the voiced initial [b], 
and will often pronounce the Chinese word as [beit<;il)], as they can't 
hear the difference between the two sounds. Once you've made these 
categories,  once  you  are  habituated  to  these  categories,  the 
categories affect your perception. There's a specialist in neuroscience 
at  UCSD  named  Vilayanum  Ramachandran.  He  summarizes  his 
findings  on  perception  by  saying,  "Perception  is  an  opinion", 
because when we heu, we don't hear the different sounds, what we 
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hear is  filtered  throllgh the different categories in the mind. This is 
true  of vision  as  weil.  The complexity of the  language, whether a 
langu~lge  separates  certain  sounds  or  not,  is  a  reflection  of  the 
comp1exity  of  the  categories  in  our  minds.  Shanghainese 
distingllishes voiced stops, voiceless unaspirated stopS  and voiceless 
aspirated  stopS,  so  for  speakers  of  Shanghainese  these  are  three 
different cognitive categories. So  they have a  more complex set of 
categories, at least in  terms of stop consonants, than most English 
speakers,  who  have  only  two  different  categories  for  the  three 
sounds. 
Another  example  is  the  difference  between  English  and 
Mandarin Chinese speakers in terms of the conception of possession. 
In English there is  no obligatory distinction between ownership and 
temporary physical possession; the verb have is  used for both. But in 
Mandarin, these two categories are distinguished. For example, if  I 
pick up this disk, this is  my floppy disk, in English I can say This  is 
my disk, and if my disk is  in the hands of someone else, I can say to 
that person, You have my disko  In Mandarin you can't do that; you 
can't say  the  equivalent of 'You  have  my  disk',  you  have  to say 
something like 'My disk is  at your place', with a locative expression 
rather than a  possessive expression (this  is  not true  of Cantonese, 
possibly  due  to  English  influence).  The  point  is  that  Mandarin 
makes a distinction between ownership and temporary possession. I 
have found that after many years of speaking Mandarin, this way of 
thinking has  affected  my  English,  so  in  situations where someone 
had something of mine, I  have  found myself saying things like  My 
disk  is  with  you,  rather than  You  have  my disko  So  my  cognitive 
categories are being influenced by  the language that I was speaking 
all  the time, in  this case a second Ianguage. But on the other hand, 
my  English  category distim:tions (and lack of them)  also  affect my 
Mandarin.  ror example, I often don't make a  distinction between 
.  1  I  I  b  I'm  a  second  person  smgular  and  secono  person  P ura,  ecause 
native English speaker; we just have you for both singular and plural. 
I find  myself, when speaking Mandarin, using just nf  (2sg pronoun) 
when  I should use  ni1nen  (2pl  pronoull) for the plural; I just forget 
d  t  thinking with just  one 
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category, not two categories. When we learn a langllage that doesn't 
make the same distinctions that we are used to ll1aking, distinctions 
that reflect the distinctions made in Ollr cognitive categories, We  will 
try  to  Eill  in  the  perceived gaps.  For example,  in  English  we  have 
obligatory tense mark.ing, but Mandarin doesn't have tense marking, 
and so  a  lot of Enghsh speakers,  when they  learn  Mandarin,  will 
look for  sOll1ething  that seems  like  tense  marking,  they'll  find  the 
perfective marker le  and then  use  it any time that they  fel'l  would 
require a past tense marker in English. Or they will over-specify. Für 
example, in EngIish, if you want to say something like J'm going to 
go  wash  my  hair,  you  have  to  include  a  possessive  pronoun  to 
specify whose hair is  going to  be  washed.  In  Mandarin YOll  don't 
have to add a possessive pronoun; you just say  Wo qLi Xl toula (lit.: I 
go wash  hair),  and  in  most contexts it's  assumed  that you  know 
whose hair you  are going  to wash;  you  don't have  to  be  specific 
about that.  Native  English  speakers  will  often  add  the  possessive 
pronolln  to such a  clause when speaking Chinese,  though, as they 
feel  the need to constrain the interpretation of whose hair is  being 
washed because they are  used  to doing so  when speaking English. 
On the other hand, a  Chinese  speaker living  in  America  for  thirty 
years  will  often  still  make mistakes  in  the  lIse  of he vs.  she  when 
speaking  English  - its  jllst  not a  categorical  difference  that  they 
have  internalized,  as  their  native  language  does  not  make  tbat 
distinction.4 
9.  The Development of Language Structure 
Now  back  to  the  development  of  language  structure.  Grammar 
develops as the originally free  collocations of lexical items  used  to 
4  The third persol1 pronoun in  spoken Chinese does not inflect for animacy or 
gender,  hut  1Il  the  early  20th  century  many  Chinese  intellcctllal,  kamee! 
English, French, or German, anel  came to fecl  the need to constr'lin, at least 
1Il wntlllg, the interpretation of the referent of the thirel person prOnOlll1,  and 
so developed different ways of writing thc third person pronolln in  Chinese 
for male, female, inanimatc, ami godly rcferents. 
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constrain the hearcr's inference in  a partiCLdar way becoll1e fixed in 
those particular structures. In cOll1municating you want to constrain 
the  hearer's  inferential  process;  in  the  beginning  you  can use  any 
words to do that, any words are still  better than no words. But then 
if you find that the particular pattern works, very often you repeat it 
again and again to constrain tbe hearer's inference in that particular 
way, and then the pattern can become fixed. First it's personal habit, 
ami we are very  l11uch  creatures of habit; all of our language use  is 
really  habit.  And  on  a  societal  level,  conventions  are  really  just 
societal habits. For example, in  Old English the word lic  'like' plus 
tbe  instrumental suffix  -e  were  used  so  often  after an adjective to 
make  explicit  an  adverbial  relation  to  a  verb  that  it  became 
conventionalized and devcloped into the adverb-forming suffix -ly, 
as in quickly,  used  obligatorily in  many contexts in  English  today 
(Lass, 1992). The frequent use of a demonstrative adjective to show 
that  a  referent  was  cognitively  accessible  conventionalized  into 
definite  marking in  English  (Pyles  and Aigeo,  1982).  You can see 
this happening in Chinese; the demonstrative adjeetive in  Chinese is 
being used so  oEten  as a  way of showing indentifiability tbat some 
people are arguing that this is  now beeoming a definite marker, just 
like in  English.  Or in Chinese,  you  had a  !ocative phrase that was 
used very often with an implieation that the action was on-going, so 
YOll  would say things like  7Zi 7,ii mir chi Nm  (3sg LOC there eat riee) 
"He is  eating there".  Eventually,  you  could drop the  "there", and 
just say  Ta  zai chi llm  (3sg  P!ZOG  eat rice), as the loeative verb zai 
was reanalyzed as a progressive marker (Chao, 1968:333). So what 
begins  as  a  conversational  implicature  over  time  becomes 
conventionalized, and then  becomes  eonventional  implieature, and 
can thcn  becolllc  further cOllventionalized  until  it  becomes part of 
thc  gral1111lar  that  forees  a  particlllar  interpretation.  Now what's 
important is  that gralllmatieal strueture tbat has become obligatory 
forees  a  partiCLdar  interpretation.  SOl11e  people  say  that languages 
diffL'f  in  terms of what you can say,  but another way to look at it is 
th~H languages  differ  in  terms  of  what  you  haue  to  say:  English 
forccs  YOll to be mueh more explieit in  certain eontexts, for example, 
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obligat0l7 constraints  on  referent  identification  we  associate  witb 
"subject"  and the use  of the subject to mark partiCldar speech act 
types. So  we use the existence of subject in  a clause and tbe position 
of  sllbject  in  the  clallse  to  mark  whether  it  is  interrogative, 
imperative,  or  declarative.  We  have  this  as  an  obligatOl'y  part of 
every sentence, and because of that we tben have to be explicit about 
who is  the subject of the sentence. Chinese has not conventionalized 
these same constraints on referent identification (LaPolla, 1993), so 
you  don't have to be  as  explicit in  terms of referent identification 
when you say something. 
Going back to the path through the field example, when you are 
going through the field  you go a  particul<u way because you find it 
expedient to go that way, but then other people start going that way 
and evcntually the grass gets worn away to form  a  path, and the 
form  of the path becomes fixed.  At so  me  point the path becomes 
recognized as the unmarked way to go through the field. This is true 
of  other  types  of  conventionalization  as  weil.  One  method!tool! 
system  for  achieving  a  particular  purpose  becomes  the  unmarked 
way to achieve that purpose, and other ways are seen as marked. 
In  language  there  are  several  ways  language  structure  can 
develop.  You  can  develop  either  a  particular  word  to  constrain 
inference  in  a  particular  way,  like  the  use  of  !ic  "Iike",  which 
developed into the adverb marking -!y,  or it can be an extension of 
so  me  pre-existing  morphology  for  some  new  use,  like  the  Qiang 
prefixes  being  extended  to  marking  perfectives  and  also  to 
imperatives. Or you can just ha  ve  the fixing of structures, like in  the 
English case where you have obligatory cross-clause co-reference in 
conjoined  clauses.  For  example,  Bernard  Comrie  once  mentioned 
(191;8: 191)  that if  YOLl  have a  sentence like  The mall dropped the 
me!on  and  burst,  [Audience  laughs[  - you  laugh,  because  the 
interpretation of that pattern in  English has to be that it is  the man 
who burst, not the melon. The structure of this pattern in  English 
has  become  fixcd,  to  the  point  that  you  have  this  ohligatory 
cross-claLlse  co-reference; thc subject of the second cIaUSl'  has  to bc 
the  same  as  the  subject  of  the  first.  The  structure  of  '['he  man 
dropped the me!on and hltrst then forces a partietdar illterpretation 
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by  disallowing certain assLlmptions  ahollt wh  at is  likely or possible 
to  be  added  to  the  context  of  interpretation.  lt has  becOll1e  so 
conventionalized it  forces  the  listener to interpret the sentence in  a 
,  t',  I,  r W'lY  even if that partiCLIlar  interpretation does not make  p<lr  leu  ,1  " 
sense.  A lot of languages don't do that. Even languages as  closely 
~elated as  ltalian don't have  such obligatory co-reference.  Chinese 
also  docsn't  force  such  co-reference.  I  have  asked  many  Chinese 
people over the years to translate that sentence into Chinese and tell 
ll1e  who or what burst, and they say  "Of course it's the ll1e1on  that 
burst; the ll1an's not going to burst." ßut in English it has to be the 
man  who  burst  because  the  grammar  forces  that  particular 
interpretation. 
10.  How Languages Differ in Terms of Complexity 
So how do languages differ in terms of complexity? They can differ 
in  terms  of  which  fllncti()!1al  dOll1ains  they  constrain  tbe 
interpretation of.  They can differ  in  terms of the  extent to  wl~ich 
they C()!1strain  it.  And they can differ in  terms of wh  at mechal1lsm 
they use to u)J1strain it. So  for example, in Chinese you can say th,e 
,  (1 7a)  whl'ch  I'S  J'lIst  "he/she ao school". You can leave It  sentence 111  ~  ,  ,  b 
at that, you  don't have  to add any  tense  marking, and you don't 
have to specify if it is  a man or a woman. In English you have to say 
"he went to school"  or "she went to school", or "he  15  g01l1g  to 
school" or "she is  going to school", and so  on, as  in  (12b-d); YOLl 
have to be more specific - the grall1ll1ar (the conventions ?f  En~!tsh 
usage)  forces  YOll  to  be  more  specific.  English  then  ditfers hom 
Chinese in  that English obligatorily C()J1strains  the interpretation of 
the  time  of  an  action  relative  tu  the  time  of  speaking  (i.e.  has 
ohligatory tense marking, as weil as obligatory gender and animacy 
Illarking for 3rd person pronouns). 
(12)  a.  7(/  qt't  xl/(!,xif)o, Chinese) 
.1sg  go  school 
h.  She went to school. / He wellt tu schoo!. 4<)0  Language Acquisition, Change c1nd Emergence 
c.  She is gaing ta schoat, I He is going to school. 
d.  She goes to school. I He goes to school. 
Now while English obligatorily constrains the interpretation  f 
.  0  past 
v~.  present  vs.  tuture  actions,  it  does  not  obligatorily  mark  a 
dlfference  between recent past and distant past actions Hf' 
•  <  •  ow  ar l!1 
the past an actl~m happened relative to the time of speaking is left up 
to mference; thls aspect of the interpretation is  not constrained  B  .  R  .  .  ut 
m  awang, a Tlbeto-Burman language of northern Burma  yo  h  .  <,  U  ave 
four  ~lfferent  pas~  tenses,  and  it  is  obligatory  to  constrain  the 
hearer s InterpretatiOn of how far in the past the action was that you 
want to talk about. Compare the Rawang examples given in  (l3a-d) 
(from my own fieldwork). 
(13)  a.  ang  di  8:m-i  'S/he  left,  went  away 
3sg  go  DIR-Intrans.PAST  (within  the  last  2 
hanrs).' 
b.  ang  di  dir- i  'S/he  went  (within  taday, 
3sg  go  TMhrs-In trans. P  AST  but  more  than  two 
hours ago).' 
c.  ang  di  ap-mi  'S/he  went (within  the  last 
3sg  go  TMdys-Intrans.PAST  year).' 
d.  fmg  di  yang-f  'S/he  went  (  SOllle  time  a 
3sg  go  TMyrs-lntrans.PAST  year or more ago).' 
.  We can see  then  that English  and Rawang both constrain the 
mference  related  to  the  interpretation  of  the  time  of  the  event 
relative  to . the  time  of  speaking,  unlike  Chinese,  but  Rawang 
constrams  Ir  to  a  much  greater  degree.  (Notice,  as  I  mentioned 
earlier,  that it  is  particular functional domains, and not languages 
that we should look at in terms of complexity. Here we see Rawang 
has  more  complexity  in  its  tense  system  than  En<>Jish,  hut  less 
complexity  in  its pronoun system,  as  it  does not  m~~<c thc  gender 
and animacy distinctions English does.) 
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Now in  terms of the type of marking you might bave, we can go 
back to tbe example I mentioned earlier about washing one's hair. I 
mentioned earlier that in  Chinese when talking about washing hair, 
you don't have to say whose hair you are washing. You can just say 
the scntence in  ( 14a). In most situations you wash your own hair. If 
you are a  professional hair washer, it might mean you are washing 
someone else's  hair  but most  of the  time  it  woulcl  mean you  are 
washing your own hair. 
(14)  a.  Ja 
3sg 
'S/he 
haie) 
zai  XI  toula (Chinese) 
PROG  wash  hair. 
is  washing  (her/his)  hair.'  (Lit.:  'S/he  IS  washing 
b.  He is washing his hair. 
c.  ,Ing  ni  zvl-shi-e  (Rawang) 
3sg  hair  wash-R/M-NPAST 
'S/he is washing her/his hair.' 
In English, as in (14b), and Rawang, as in  (14c), you have to be 
explicit,  you  have  to say whose hair is  being washed, but the way 
you are explicit differs between the two Ianguages. The way you are 
explicit in  English is to have a possessive acljective on the noun, as in 
his hair,  whereas in Rawang you don 't put any marking on the noun 
itself,  you  put a  reflexiveImiddie  marker on  the  verb,  which then 
marks the  fact that the washer and the person whose hair is  being 
washed are the same. So  both Rawang and English are constraining 
the  interpretation,  unlike  Chinese,  but  in  this  case  they  llse  very 
different types of morphology, in one language a  pre-nolln genitive 
modifier, and in  the other a post-verbal reflexive suffix. 
11.  Conclusion 
To  conclude,  langllage  is  not  an  absolute  necessity  for 
COllllllllllicatioll, thOligh without Ianguagc the addressee's inferential 492  Langllage Acquisition, Change and Emerg('11cc 
task in creating the context of interpretation can be  gllite complex. 
Thcrefore communicators  attempt to simplify  the  addressee's  task 
by  constraining  the  addressec's  infcrcntial  proccss  with  a  more 
cxplieit ostensive <let  which includes the use of lingllistie farms, and 
when  the  partiCLIlar  pattern  they  lIse  to  do  so  is  repeated  often 
enollgh  and  by  enough  people  it  can  become  fixed  as  language 
structure. The consegllenee of this is  that simplifying the addressee's 
task  eomplieates  the  eommllnieator's  tas!<,  as  the  ostensive  aet 
produeed  by the eommunieator has  to  be  more eomplex.  As  eaeh 
soeiety  views  the  world  differently,  eommunieators  in  different 
soeieties will differ in terms of whieh partiCLIlar fllnetional domains 
they fee!  the need to eonstrain the interpretation of, to what degree 
they constrain the interpretation of a  partiellhu funetional  domain, 
and what meehanism they use to eonstrain the interpretation. These 
are  the  differenees  that  lead  to  the  differenees  in  the  degree  of 
eomplexity of the sub-systems of different langllages. 
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